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100   Appalachia
Accidents
Analysis from the White Mountains of  
New Hampshire and occasionally elsewhere
As often happens in the winter Whites, last January brought a number of freeze-thaw cycles that created plenty of slippery spots 
and bonding problems on avalanche-prone slopes. In years past such a setup 
has spawned ample trouble, and winter and spring 2018 offered their share. 
But unlike prior winters’ mishaps, most of the 2018 accidents ended happily, 
even when climbers, sliders, and wanderers found downhill woe. So here’s 
that rarity: a happy Accidents column with no fatalities but with a few cau-
tions attached.
Checked In
On Sunday, April 22, 2018, Christophe C., age 70, set out from the Appala-
chia trailhead parking area at 7:45 a.m. for a partial Presidential Range traverse 
that would take him back to Pinkham Notch, where he had spent Saturday 
night. A cab dropped him off at the parking area, and Christophe aimed for 
summits: first Mount Adams and, from there, Mount Jefferson. The going 
was slow, and on Jefferson’s summit, Christophe decided to bail out from his 
planned route and descend the Caps Ridge Trail. From that trail’s base, he 
walked down Jefferson Notch Road to the Base Road, where he stashed his 
pack to make for lighter, quicker walking. Christophe then walked out the 
Base Road to the Mount Washington Hotel, where he checked in at 1 a.m.
Once checked in, Christophe messaged his wife, Marie, about his change 
in plans and turned toward sleep. Marie was awake and wondering about 
her husband, but she never got his message. So, at 3:48 a.m., she called 
New Hampshire State Police, who began looking for Christophe’s car. They 
found it at the Pinkham Notch Visitor Center, and at 6:30 a.m. they called 
New Hampshire Fish and Game to report a missing hiker. NHFG’s Lt. Wayne 
Saunders took charge and asked Marie about her husband’s projected route. 
She knew only that her husband was hiking in the Whites. Saunders began to 
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organize a search. A combination of cold weather, wintry ground conditions, 
Christophe’s age, and a reported medical condition (not released to the public) 
helped NHFG decide to make that search an urgent, large one.
That weather gets its own paragraph here because it offers an ongoing 
reminder of how winter hangs on in the high Whites. April 22’s temperature 
averaged 18 degrees Fahrenheit at the Mount Washington Observatory, and on 
the 23rd rose only to an average of 27. Both days featured full sun. But only a 
few days earlier, on the 20th, a foot of snow had fallen, and an added half-foot 
had accumulated in the following days. So, it was effectively still winter in the 
Whites, and Saunders knew time could be crucial.
At 10 a.m. a full-scale search got underway, with teams from NHFG and 
Androscoggin Valley Search and Rescue, snow rangers from the U.S. Forest 
Service, and snowcat drivers from Mount Washington State Park. Saunders 
also asked for and received a Black Hawk helicopter from the New Hampshire 
Army National Guard (NHANG). With all of this capability, searchers began 
to scour the trails above and below treeline, while the helicopter looked 
from above.
Not long after the search had begun, Saunders was updating Christophe’s 
family when he learned that they had just gotten a call from Christophe. He 
was at the Mount Washington Hotel, exhausted from yesterday’s hike, and 
he’d just awakened, unaware that he was the object of a large search. Saunders 
confirmed that this was indeed Christophe and then drove to the hotel, where 
at 1 p.m. Saunders interviewed Christophe.
Comment: This story was widely—and, at times, derisively—reported, 
with emphasis laid on Christophe going to a “posh” hotel* while the (by 
implication) regular folks of the world searched for him. But that slurs 
Christophe, I think, and misses the points that deserve attention.
Christophe made many mistakes: He failed to leave a detailed trip plan, he 
attempted an ambitious hike in winter-like conditions, he waited until 1 a.m. 
to send any message home, and then he did not check to be sure that message 
had been received. But once overextended, Christophe made some good 
decisions, the chief one being to bail out down the west side of the mountain, 
even though that left him a long way from his car at Pinkham Notch. Had he 
simply confirmed that his message had reached home, this would have been a 
*See, for example, “Massive search finds overdue hiker . . . checked in at the Mount Wash-
ington Hotel,” New Hampshire Union Leader, April 25, 2018. See unionleader.com/outdoors/
massive-search-finds-overdue-hiker--checked-in-at-the-mount-washington-hotel--20180424.
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self-rescue. What happened can be seen as another variation of the warnings 
not to rely too much on modern technology.
And the aftermath of this story offers a glimpse into Christophe’s personality. 
He was chagrined (as most would be) when he found that a large search had 
Whiteouts strip away the markers that locate us and substitute an uncertainty where 
even earth and sky can be confused. JERRY MONKMAN/ECOPHOTOGRAPHY
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been mounted. As would be true for most of us, he didn’t court attention or try 
to counter the media stories. Instead, he waited for attention to wash onto what 
came next, and then, before bills could be sent or any new outrage kindled, he 
sent NHFG a $3,000 check to defray the expenses of the search. That initiative 
and Christophe’s remorse helped NHFG’s Colonel Kevin Jordan decide not 
to bill him for his negligence leading to the search. The $3,000 he sent doesn’t 
account for the volunteers’ time and their disrupted lives nor cover the cost 
of the helicopter, although NHANG usually flies such a search as a training 
mission. The sum was nearly double NHFG’s expenses for the short search. 
In a statement to the Manchester Union Leader published on July 11, Jordan 
said, “I could have still billed him. I just felt based on his remorsefulness, his 
respect, his understanding of the situation, and his promptness in getting a 
$3,000 check off before he had to at that point showed all good signs [that] we 
had accomplished what we set out to do.”
Jordan noted that the military waived the cost of the helicopter, which flies 
at a rate he estimated at $6,000 per hour. He cautioned that the military might 
not waive those expenses in the future. That expense and who covers it may be 
one of the major, future stories of search and rescue in the Whites.
A final thought: For rescuers, confusion and uncertainty are often givens 
when they receive a call and set out to find or help someone. Most of us, 
however, read a narrative after the rescue’s over, when a solution seems simple 
and obvious. “Just wait a bit, and see if he reappears,” I heard one person say 
about this story and the search it launched. But Christophe’s story points yet 
again to the way that our volunteers and professionals must sometimes make 
search-and-rescue decisions from sketchy information, or very little at all, and 
when they decide, they usually land on the side of offering significant help.
White Space
Column readers are familiar with “shoulder season” stories, and this is another 
one. November 27, 2017, visited winter-cold temperatures and 3.2 inches of 
snow outside the Mount Washington Observatory. The average temperature 
was 11 degrees F (14 degrees below normal), and the wind blew through at a 
perky 58-mph average. So it takes little imagination to conjure spinning sheets 
of snow and tough visibility.
Not far from that summit, just after noon, Scott Z., age 47, had reached 
the point where the Monroe Loop leaves the Crawford Path, but he could 
see no trails at all. Above treeline and exposed to the pushy northwest wind, 
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Scott reached an uncertainty. He pulled out his phone and called for help. 
NHFG Lt. Brad Morse got the call, which included Scott’s phone number 
and coordinates. Morse called Scott and left a message to call him, which 
Scott did a little after 1 p.m. Morse, having plotted Scott’s location, told Scott 
to turn around and follow his tracks back along the ridgeline, explaining that 
this would take him into the relative shelter of trees in a little under a mile. 
Scott agreed and reported that his phone was carrying an 80-percent charge, 
and he signed off.
At 2:05 p.m. Scott called back, saying he felt he was off trail again, in four 
feet of snow with no visibility. Morse plotted Scott’s new coordinates and called 
back to tell him that he was still on the Crawford Path and had made 0.75 mile 
of headway since his last call. Morse “advised him to continue in the same 
direction and attempt to follow his trail or the ridgeline,” which would take 
him to the trees and protection from the wind “in a short distance.” Morse 
also said that he would send several rescuers to Scott’s assistance. Scott agreed 
to the plan. By then he also reported that his phone battery had dropped to 
under 10-percent charge; at 2:13 p.m. Morse lost contact with Scott.
Morse summoned three fellow NHFG conservation officers, who at 
4:10 p.m. left the trailhead to find Scott. Ten minutes later, they returned 
with Scott. In an interview with Morse, Scott said that after their last phone 
conversation he had relocated the Crawford Path and kept descending. When 
he reached the Edmands Path, he had decided to “bail out,” which took him to 
Mount Clinton Road, where he ran into the COs. Scott characterized himself 
as “an experienced hiker,” and Morse found that “he was well equipped for 
hiking in winter conditions.”
Comment: This phone-guided rescue verges on self-rescue, in keeping 
with the happy-endings theme for this column. But before we get too happy, 
let’s go back up to the site of Scott’s initial call and the fully realized winter 
that surrounded him. “Experience” can bring us to such a meeting between 
hiker and weather, but, unless that experience includes time already spent in 
such severe weather, the security of being experienced can fly away as quickly 
as a dropped mitten in a gale. Scott said in his post-noon call that he felt lost 
in a whiteout. We can imagine ourselves in such a new (and terrifying) reality. 
Morse, who knows these ridges and weathers well, served as the tether that 
kept Scott in touch with where he was and how he might get back to a point 
where his world again cohered. The hour between his first and second calls, 
while he battled down the Crawford Path ridge, obviously was a fraught one. 
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Scott was fortunate that his phone battery had enough charge for one more 
call just after 2 p.m. It kept him from stalling in the white room where he was 
stuck, and it kept rescuers from wondering where they might have to go. Once 
he reached the woods, Scott had returned to a world he recognized, one where 
he was fine.
Whiteouts strip away the markers that locate us and substitute an 
uncertainty where even earth and sky can be confused. What’s down and 
what’s up, we wonder. For the locator-animals we are, such uncertainty is very 
bad news, and it made Scott reach for his phone. Here’s a rescue where a 
phone was a boon. It allowed Lt. Morse to orient Scott, and, even as rescuers 
were finally brought in, it kept them from walking up into the open question 
of Scott’s direction; it gave them an aimpoint. Phones and other tech devices 
often provide false confidence that encourages overextension because help 
seems always at hand. But here, trouble materialized in heavy wind and stirred 
snow, through which only Scott’s phone signal could penetrate. Scott didn’t go 
out seeking a whiteout and its frightening stasis; it found him, and he called 
out from its booth where he was stuck.
Did Scott’s experience justify his climbing on that ridge on this day? I’d say 
not. Could he have anticipated such conditions? The observatory forecast for 
snow and strong northwest winds, which would obscure the Crawford Path’s 
approach, suggest that, yes, with a close reading and given his experience, he 
could have anticipated the day and the way it blew in a white space.
Water-Girt
A thaw replete with significant rain let loose the mountains’ most lethal ele-
ment on January 12, 2018, and the rising waters trapped an Appalachian 
Mountain Club guided hike between impassable brooks. The two guides and 
The group members began their return descent to the 
Highland Center and soon encountered Crawford Brook, 
which they had crossed earlier. But now it had become an 
impassable torrent.
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eight hikers had left the Highland Center early that morning and climbed the 
Avalon Trail to the A-Z Trail, which they planned to follow to Zealand Falls 
Hut for a two-night stay. Reaching a brook on the Zealand Trail on the west 
side of the Willey Range, the party found it flooded and determined it unsafe 
to cross. After some scouting for safe passage brought no better option, they 
turned back for the Highland Center.
January 12’s weather summary from the nearby Mount Washington 
Observatory recorded an inch of rain and an average temperature of 40. At 
the lower elevations the hiking party was crossing, it was even warmer, and 
a lot of water melted out from the snowpack. Once a snowpack is saturated 
in winter, brooks rise rapidly. The AMC group members began their return 
descent to the Highland Center and soon encountered Crawford Brook, 
which they had crossed earlier. But now it had become an impassable torrent. 
The two guides scouted up- and downstream for a safe passage but found 
none. As the afternoon deepened, they called AMC for assistance, and after 
SAR coordinator James Wrigley spoke with the guides and ascertained that 
they needed help, he called NHFG. Lt. Brad Morse took charge of the effort, 
and, given the technical nature of the river crossing, Morse asked for help 
from Mountain Rescue Service. At 8 p.m. a group of nine rescuers (one CO, 
seven from MRS, and one from AMC) left the Highland Center and climbed 
toward the stranded hikers. At 10:50 p.m. rescuers reached the hikers, where 
they set up a brook crossing, helped the hikers over it, and walked with them 
back to the Highland Center. Even while rescuers did their work, the streams 
were beginning to recede as the rain faded and winter cold began its return.
Comment: As noted earlier, a full-blooded thaw, with rain and warm 
temps, can act quickly on backcountry streams. Snow can act as a buffer and 
soak up initial rains and meltwater, but once it’s wet, everything begins to go 
downhill. River ice may also slow or spread the waters initially, but significant 
rain and thaw together often blow out ice blocks, leaving a roaring current 
between slippery banks of ice and snow. And, of course, that water is very 
cold; falling in is life-threatening. All of this proves the need for real caution 
when crossing streams during a thaw, and AMC’s group exercised such caution 
twice. The first time, doing so frustrated members’ plan to reach and stay at 
Zealand Fall Hut; the second time, it kept them out deep into the night as they 
tried to get back to the Highland Center. That the group didn’t try to force 
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passage in either case points to good leadership. It can’t have been easy to get 
nowhere—in sum—over the course of a wet day and half a night.
Because weather’s variability increases with climate change, we are likely 
to see more of these quick melts. Cold was on its way back in that evening, 
and so, waiting for that stabilization was an option, but the group was not 
carrying shelter for ten; they had planned to stay at Zealand Falls Hut. So, after 
a conversation with AMC SAR coordinator James Wrigley, the guides decided 
that, in the face of predicted falling temperatures, getting out that night 
was prudent.
The question raised in the aftermath of the incident and one we arrive 
at in this column is: Should the hikers have set out to Zealand at all? The 
forecasted rain and thaw, and the near certainty that a lot of water would 
be moving, suggests it would have been wise to wait a day or cancel. Such 
factors as scheduled departures and returns, as well as reservations, can nudge 
us toward carrying on when we might be better off delaying or opting out. 
In a note, Wrigley did say, “The incident led to some discussion regarding go/
no-go decisions based upon weather. In retrospect the amount of water that 
was forecasted along with temperatures should have raised some flags.”
Finally, party size may have influenced the decision to call for help. 
Well-equipped solo hikers or twosomes can wait out a river rise and make 
an informal camp with less trouble than can a group of ten.
Seeds of Disinformation: Some Thoughts About Calling Out
On mild January 20, 2018, a group of nine from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Outing Club climbed the East Peak of Mount Osceola with the 
aim of going on to the main summit. But once atop the 4,156-foot subsidiary 
peak, they found the trail too slippery and decided to turn back. During their 
descent, around 2:30 p.m., Megan C. slipped and injured her leg. A passing 
hiker called 911 as he headed down, but the reception was spotty, so the call 
was cut off before the caller could identify himself. 
At a little after 4 p.m. NHFG received a call from state police reporting the 
accident. Sgt. Thomas Dakai took charge of the response. Dakai first called the 
number from which the original 911 call had come; he had no name because 
that call had been dropped. Dakai got no answer and left a voicemail, which 
he followed with a text message, asking for a call back.
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Using the coordinates offered by the call, Dakai plotted its origin as the 
Mount Osceola Trail about a half-mile above its junction with the Greely 
Ponds Trail. Dakai summoned two more COs to the Greely Ponds trailhead 
on Route 112. As he drove to meet his fellow officers, Dakai learned that the 
caller by then had contacted the town of Lincoln police to say that he was 
a passerby; originally, he had reported the injured person as male, and he 
corrected that to say she was female.
As the COs prepared to hike in from the trailhead, five members of the 
party appeared. They reported that the injured hiker was with three others, 
and all four were making their way down slowly. Two COs started in, and a 
half-mile in and a little after 7 p.m., they met the rest of the party and turned 
and hiked back out with them.
During a subsequent interview, Dakai asked if the party had been aware 
that the passerby was going to call in the accident. After some silence, the 
group said, yes, they were aware. As he was driving away from the incident, 
Dakai also finally got a return call from John B., the hiker who had made the 
911 call. In a later phone call, Dakai asked Megan why her group had not called 
911 instead of having a passerby do so. She was unsure and thought perhaps 
they hadn’t had cell service, but she also made clear that she and the group had 
intended to hike out on their own, with or without help.
Comment: This incident, although not serious, illustrates a problem 
rescuers commonly face, the outflow of partial and inaccurate information. 
As in the Crawford Path incident, phones enabled rescuers to hear from and 
locate people more quickly, but they also broadcast seeds of disinformation. 
Spotty reception cut off the call before the full story came out.
Cell coverage problems are common in the Whites, but the main problem 
in such situations is another common one: A passerby feels compelled to call 
but then moves on or vanishes. What John’s call conveys in this incident is a 
sense of emergency with no specifics that would help Sgt. Dakai discern what 
sort of response he should gather. The passerby’s information was composed of 
fleeting impressions, and one can imagine him then hurrying off in search of a 
signal. What results is often emergency compounded by mystery, all of which 
is dumped in a CO’s lap from afar. 
One rule of response from veteran Tuckerman Ravine snow rangers Brad 
Ray and Chris Joosen might help those of us who come upon an accident and 
must then decide if and when to call for help. When you are evaluating and 
describing a problem you have witnessed, do so sitting down, even if you are 
in a gale. If you call, speak slowly. Being seated and speaking deliberately slow 
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the flow of emergency’s juice, adrenaline, and rescuers on the other end of the 
line are likely to get better information on which to found their efforts.
Times Tough
This is the story of two days and a night, all compressed into less than 24 
hours, which is to say that conventional time isn’t always a reliable measure 
when the going gets tough in the Presidentials.
Wednesday at 5:35 p.m. is not a usual time for a rescue call, but on January 
10, 2018, NHFG Lt. Wayne Saunders answered one. Sometime earlier, a 
locator beacon registered to Amy B., age 45, had sent aloft its distress signal 
from the flank of Mount Monroe. The beacon service had alerted Amy’s point 
of contact, her friend Jeff A., at 5:10 p.m.; he in turn called in the emergency. 
Saunders hurried to get three COs and respond.
The day had been a fine one: abundant sunshine, average temperature of 20 
(15 degrees above normal), with a moderate (for adjacent Mount Washington) 
northwest wind averaging 40 mph at the observatory on top. That fine weather, 
tracked for days as it neared, had been part of Amy’s planning. Not a dedicated 
deep-winter hiker, but surely an experienced hiker who was within sniffing 
distance of completing her list of the 67 highest peaks in New England, Amy 
had climbed Washington a number of times before. Before oncoming tax 
season swept her—a certified public accountant—into its own seasonal storm, 
she hoped for a free day on the mountain.
In the days leading up to her hike, Amy repeatedly checked the weather for 
the 10th, and even though a grand day was promised, her experience and sense 
of order informed her decision to pack 30 pounds of gear into her backpack. 
She drove to the Ammonoosuc Ravine Trail’s base and began her climb at a 
little after 8 a.m. Just before she did so, she checked the weather again, renewed 
her hikeSafe card, and walked over to look at the trail’s outset. The weather 
forecast continued to promise a good day, with possible rain and ice moving in 
that night; the trail was hard-packed, easy walking, even as the past few days 
had dropped around 6 inches of new snow on the mountain. The day was a 
blue-sky “yes.” Amy donned her pack, decided to forgo her snowshoes, and 
started off. As she climbed, Amy also turned on her phone tracker so a friend 
could follow her progress.
The morning was as promised, and Amy interspersed climbing at pace with 
taking tens of photos, a sort of celebration of all she could see. On beautiful 
mountain days the photos we take are often postcards to ourselves—look 
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where I was, and what a day! Amy passed Lakes of the Clouds Hut a little 
before 11 a.m. and, admiring all around her and taking more photos, reached 
the Tuckerman Crossover to Tuckerman Ravine at around noon. There she 
noted that the wind felt stronger, and she turned up for the top.
Amy’s schedule called for reaching the summit by 12:30 p.m. and descending 
to her car by 4 p.m.; that was both her intent and routine. She checked in 
with her father by phone at 12:30, with her friend Jeff soon after, and kept 
climbing. Amy summited at 1:30 p.m., still enjoying a gorgeous day, and she 
checked in again with Jeff. The wind had accelerated some, with worrisome 
gusts. (Observatory records would show those winds gusted to 70 mph on the 
10th.) She began to feel a bit uneasy, and as she started down, she hurried a bit, 
ate half a sandwich, and discarded the rest. She also noted that all the photos 
she’d taken had run down her phone’s battery, but she plugged in a portable 
battery charger and went down.
At the junction for the Crossover, Amy’s premonition shifted to outright 
worry. She could see sheets of snow rising from the ground and off Mount 
Monroe, obliterating her earlier footprints. When Amy reached Lakes of the 
Clouds Hut and the trail sign for her descent, she could see no sign of the 
boot-track path. Three times she began her descent where she thought the 
trail should be; three times she got quickly into deep, soft snow and climbed 
back to the hut. It was now after 2 p.m., and the imperative to get down grew 
stronger. There, her phone went dead.
Two drainages nearly converge at the hut: the Ammonoosuc River and its 
eponymous trail and Monroe Brook, which bears away then to the left of a 
descending hiker. Amy knew she wanted to trend to the right and tried to do 
so, but somehow in the wind and snow-swaddled terrain, she ended up in the 
Monroe Brook drainage, fighting her way down. Here, the accelerant of real 
fear took over, beginning to drive her over rough terrain and through deep 
snow, with a goal now of simply getting to the trees. There, at least, would be 
relative shelter. At 2:35 p.m. at the outset of this wallow down, Amy pressed her 
emergency SPOT signal. “I knew I wasn’t getting out that night, and I wanted 
people to know where to find me,” she said later. “Pressing that button was 
very hard.”
Then she kept working to get down, sinking into holes, getting caught by 
krummholz, rolling at times through the steep snow. Her descent stripped 
away a water bottle and phone charger, broke a pole and, most troublesome, 
joined work’s sweat with the snow in soaking her. Amy estimates that by dusk, 
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at a little after 4 p.m., she’d descended a mile and a half. There, in the thin trees, 
she stopped and found an open area where she could be seen. “I knew I needed 
to stop and make camp before it got dark,” she said. “And I was very tired.” 
That began the wait, a wait intensified by fear as she found that her struggle 
through the snow had soaked both her and her extra gear, even through a 
waterproof pack. She now worried about hypothermia.
Amy cut branches for insulation between her and the snow, got out her 
emergency shelter and wrapped herself in it, put on both her hats, and fought a 
sense of rising panic and the cold. Waiting can be even harder than wallowing. 
She could feel the heat generated from her descent draining off. To combat her 
cooling Amy had a bivy sack and shelter, but no food and only frozen water 
and wet clothing. Both to stay active and to get warmth, Amy gathered bark 
shavings and sticks and started a fire. Even in the wind, she got it to take, and 
she felt the lift of its light and small heat; she warmed her cold feet over it, but 
it blew out before she could dry anything. It was a little after 6:30 p.m.
Time crawled forward, and Amy kept working to fight off the cold and 
worried about those waiting at home. Around 8 p.m. she started another 
fire, which burned hotter, lasted longer, and offered again some warmth and 
optimism. She got out bivy sack number 2 and a foil blanket. Part of the time 
it rained and sleeted. At some point, while cutting brush and fighting through 
scrub, Amy cut her hand significantly, and she was only partially able to stanch 
the blood with bandaging. She waited.
As she waited, Amy also blew her emergency whistle periodically. She kept 
alternating standing, sitting, and working to keep moving; she did exercises; 
she whistled into the darkness. After midnight, she began to look forward to 
dawn. “If,” she said to herself, “I can get there, I can try to get down.”
Around 1:55 a.m., she blew her whistle again. She got a “Hello?” in response. 
And soon after she got COs Matt Holmes, Mark Ober, and Jim Cyr, who had 
warm Gatorade and dry socks, as well as other assistance. A little later, the 
four began their descent, working back 0.8 mile to the trail and then down, 
emerging from the woods around 4 a.m.
Comment: Amy generously shared this tough tale, and its details 
contain much of the cautioning this column’s comments usually offer. What 
recommends it as a cautionary story is the way even the most prepared of us 
can face a weather shift and unanticipated trouble. Even as we may have been 
up many mountains in many weathers, no one day copies exactly those that 
precede it. Surprise always waits in the Whites.
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In retrospect, Amy was gathered into the spirit of an expansive, blue-sky 
day, where the pleasure of seeing and sharing it via photos and phone slowed 
her from her usual adherence to a plan. When the wind rose and blew that 
beauty into clouds of snow that obscured the way, Amy was still up high 
and had fallen behind schedule. This new experience rattled her. The simple 
following of a trail became a nightmare of guesswork, which then became an 
off-trail struggle in deep snow without snowshoes. Even the COs who rescued 
Amy said they were sinking in to their waists with their snowshoes on.
Snowshoes. When snow is on the ground, whatever the condition of 
the trail, take them. It’s impossible to predict when or if we’ll be driven off 
trail. The tracking system on Amy’s phone might have led her back along the 
route she ascended, but at the hut her phone went dead and even her backup 
chargers were depleted, and so she had to guess. That phone failure also left 
her guessing about whether her emergency signal had gotten through. And so 
the mix of equipment failure and inexperience in such weather plunged Amy 
into her long night. Phone technology fails at inopportune times, especially 
in winter, when cold saps batteries and backup chargers. A winter hiker needs 
other fallbacks. Amy’s packing for contingency, her resilience, and her rescuers’ 
persistence saved her.
One puzzling lacuna is the gulf of time between when Amy remembered 
pressing her SPOT device, at 2:35 p.m., and her contact Jeff’s receiving notice 
of its activation two and a half hours later, at 5:10. Jeff then called NHFG, 
who recorded his call at 5:35 p.m., and the rescue began. It seems that the signal 
must not have gotten through until that later hour.
Some key junctures emerge from the fear-amped afternoon. First, trouble 
was in the offing when the snow blew up into clouds while Amy stood at the 
Crossover junction; the second was at the hut, where three times she tried 
to set out on the trail down. In both instances, what’s called for is calm, and 
what the situation urges is anxious hurry. Sitting in the lee of the hut for some 
minutes and looking at a map, getting out her compass, and even trying to see 
if her phone could be rejuvenated might have helped Amy find the right way 
down. Of course, she still would have had to contend with the newly blown-in 
snow. Also, as the night-wait deepened, it would have been good to have a 
cache of emergency food and some way to melt snow.
At the outset of this account, I alluded to the way reality can blur in the 
dark hours of emergency. Here’s a little more evidence of that strangeness in 
NHFG’s Lt. Saunders’ reflection after the rescue: “They [the three COs] said it 
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was strange. [After they made voice contact] they could see her but not quite 
get to her. It took 30 minutes to get to her, swimming through the snow and 
brush,” Saunders said. “The guys were pretty beat when they came out.”
Amy has expressed her gratitude by telling her story so that others may 
learn from it, and by going with family and friends to thank NHFG and 
donating $1,000 for purchase of equipment for their rescue team.
An added note: I asked Amy if she had a takeaway or two, and she offered 
two that resonate with much of what this column is about: First, yes, carry 
emergency gear, but make sure you also know how all of it works. Practice 
with it. And second, it’s OK to ask for help, even when you are experienced 
and expect not to need it.
Solo or No-No
Readers may have noted that three of the preceding incidents involved solo 
hikers. That raises a favorite question among hikers and search-and-rescue 
personnel: Should someone hike alone, and if so, when?
I have a few thoughts, which regular readers of this column will recognize, 
and, as you think this through, I wonder what your thoughts are. People hike 
and climb solo for a number of reasons; chief among them are preference for 
being alone and convenience. (If you hike in midweek, it can be hard to find 
companions; a troop of one has only one schedule to consider.)
In each of these three solo incidents, I can make a sound argument for 
why it was a risky choice. For Christophe, the mix of his age, the week’s 
preceding snowfall, and projected length of his hike suggest that he would 
have benefited from being with a competent companion or two. Scott climbed 
into conditions common to winter but which stymied him. Being able to 
work out how to deal with his limited vision and trouble finding the trail 
with experienced, companion hikers would have been useful. Amy climbs solo 
often, and she had the fitness and gear she needed. What outflanked her were 
the winter weather and her relative inexperience with it. A hiking companion 
might have felt superfluous on the blue-sky day she had at first, but when 
the wind rose and the blown snow obscured the way, another problem-solver 
might have helped.
I take to trails solo most of the time, and so I think a lot about it and 
certainly don’t condemn the choice. Before I go, I review my route or routes 
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and the predicted weather in granular fashion: What’s the terrain, what do 
forecasters predict, and what small variations do I predict from reading maps 
and radar? Then I run through possible scenarios and what they may ask of me, 
both in resolve and equipment. If this trip then looks familiar, if I have “been 
there” before, I feel OK about taking the solo risk. If, however, something in 
the scene looks new—weather or ground conditions, terrain, region, trail—I 
may back away toward something familiar, and save the new for a time when 
a friend or friends can join me.
Winter Reading
In past issues, I’ve often cited the stories and advice available to winter’s 
climbers and sliders on the Mount Washington Avalanche Center’s website 
(mountwashingtonavalanchecenter.org). If you want to know about sliding 
snow, or sliding on it, that site is the place to go. While the site’s articles 
describe what takes place in Mount Washington’s famous east-facing ravines 
and bowls (Tuckerman and Huntington, primarily), its lessons apply to any 
snow slope. Reading its predictions and summaries is like having a very snow-
smart friend.
I recommend reading the analysis of a number of avalanches in Tuckerman 
Ravine on April 7, 2018. The USFS snow rangers offer a clear summary of the 
weather that preceded and set up that day, and then the way the fresh snow 
slabs on its peopled slopes responded to all those skis and feet. In keeping with 
this column’s happy-endings theme, injuries on that day were few and not life-
threatening, even as the snow-action was impressive—and cautionary. You can 
get to the site in a few clicks; if you like winter slopes, it’s always worth the trip.
Running the Risk
A version of this piece first appeared on the site iRunFar (irunfar.com), an 
excellent resource for stories and advice about moving at pace in mountains 
around the world, and especially in the American West. Its two editors, Meghan 
Hicks and Byron Powell, are accomplished backcountry runners and humanists.
Mountain-running or speed-hiking, especially in new terrain (but even on 
your home mountain), will always be edgy because it seeks out ways and 
lands and weathers that contain lots of edges.
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Perhaps the greatest risk lies in a stretch of time when a risky activity feels 
expansive, both personally and societally. That phase, which draws in growing 
numbers of inexperienced people and which seems current in our mountains, 
overwhelms any system of elders passing on essential knowledge to the new. 
In its congestion, it also may foster more competition, as the novices seek to 
“make their bones” and rise above the general rabble of us. So often, I think, 
this need to be known is rooted in a need to be notable to one’s self.
Over the past few years, while researching Critical Hours (University 
Press of New England, 2018), my book about search and rescue in the White 
Mountains, and while continuing this semiannual column analyzing mountain 
accidents, I’ve had a chance to think more about the risks we take when we aim 
for and run along the edges of the trail-world we love. It is, both in topography 
and psychology, a vertiginous world. 
Still, runners and other quick travelers make up a very thin fraction of 
those who encounter trouble in our mountains. Every so often, I get a report 
of rescue of a trail runner or some-related-one seeking speedy passage over our 
mountain trails, but I don’t see many. Even as ultrarunners and adventurers 
press on and at limits and incur plenty of pain in doing so, there’s surprisingly 
little call for rescue from this foot-happy community. What accounts for that? 
And how do those of us who view going out long as living large envision risk 
as we step-step away? These seem important questions for each of us as we look 
up and out to our mountains.
In my book, I devoted a chapter to such questions, though I used for 
example the study of the way two minimalist, long-distance hikers on the 
Appalachian Trail got in gradual trouble on a textbook day for hypothermia. 
But within that chapter I also cited Yitka Winn’s fine insights from a 2016 
Trail Runner piece on the death of ultrarunner Arturo Hector Martinez Rueda 
in Patagonia. Within Winn’s thoughts are good points about both the gifts 
and potential problems that endurance athletes bring to their trails. Those 
trails ignore the loops of track and field and the pavements of road racing and 
head instead out into the hills. From those hills, runners have to conjure their 
own returns.
A few of Winn’s comments:
 
Serious accidents and fatalities are not uncommon in the worlds of 
climbing, mountaineering, and backcountry skiing. Such communities 
are accustomed to grappling with questions of risk, of where respon-
sibility belongs when things go wrong. Entire books are devoted to 
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detailing preventable disasters in the mountains, and the lessons others 
can glean from them. 
    For many of us trail runners, though, these conversations are 
uncharted waters—especially those who arrive to the sport with a 
background not in wilderness travel, but in endurance. In some ways 
the very tenets of trail running’s culture fly in the face of the traditional 
code of caution. Every mountaineer’s been taught to be wary of “sum-
mit fever.” Conversely, many ultrarunners’ code is “to endure at all 
costs; DNF* is a dirty word.” 
     We travel light, we push through pain, we chuckle at our body’s 
physical rebellions, joke about stumbling or hallucinating or vomiting. 
For our stubbornness and triumphs, we’re awarded medals and belt 
buckles. We get labeled inspirations, immortals, machines, kings and 
queens of the mountains, conquerors of the wild. 
      And sometimes we are. 
      But it becomes easy for any of us—runners or race organizers, out-
door veterans or novices, midpackers or elite runners—to forget how 
thin the line between life and death on the trail really is. 
Twinned with Winn’s writing as a spur for thought was Luke Nelson’s quiet, 
insightful iRunFar post about mountain running and risk from June 2016. 
Framed by a stormy-day run, where Nelson judged that he had just enough 
wherewithal to come back intact, and triggered by Rueda’s death a few months 
earlier, Nelson’s post looked closely at accidents and the contributing factors 
of ignorance and complacency. What he wanted to know and have us think 
about is where responsibility lies in this life of going out into upland terrain, 
whether it’s along the arranged course of a race, or the self-conjured route of 
a solo run. Both Winn’s and Nelson’s pieces rewarded rereading, as do many 
of the comments they occasioned.
I’ve a few thoughts to add, and I hope you will add yours. Both Winn and 
Nelson point to the role of experience in shaping a healthy perspective on trail 
running’s risks. Bruising encounters with the land get pointed to as primary 
teachers, ways in which we grow wiser as miles accrue. My own experience 
in the mountains suggests that whatever wisdom I’ve developed stems from 
my experience and what both my conscious (rational) mind and its larger, 
*Did not finish.
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unconscious twin make of it. Whenever I have a decision to make—do I turn 
back, keep on, break out my map?—I am of two minds.
Those two minds offer decision variously. I make my rational calls by 
weighing observations and evidence and measuring them against my tolerance 
for risk. Which has also been arrived at rationally. Then, there is intuition, that 
tingling “spider-sense,” where I just know what I’ll do, often instantly—I’ll 
risk this cloud; I won’t risk that one. Over time I’ve come to trust my intuition 
in certain places (on Mount Cardigan, my home mountain, for example), 
while in others (new lands, a western glacier), I hear its voice as noise only, and 
I try to stay in my “right,” my rational mind. On a best day, both minds are 
fired up and in agreement; then I am as fully aware as I can be. Not, of course, 
immune to risk and accident, but as inoculated as possible against it.
Knowing a bit about one’s intuition seems useful and necessary, partly 
because it is so quick to make its call and partly because over time many of 
us come to trust it. The speedy, inner workings of intuition came clearer to 
me when I read Danny Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2011). There, while describing intuition’s sometimes eerie insights, 
Kahneman offered a story about a fire chief who, while leading his crew in 
battling a blaze, got an intuition of trouble. The chief cleared his crew from the 
building, and immediately after that, the building fell in, a collapse that would 
likely have killed them all.
How did the chief “know” to leave the building? Rational analysis of the 
facts at that moment pointed away from his decision, but later analysis showed 
that the chief had somehow guessed that the fire was configured differently 
from what everyone then thought. That feeling of difference, that intuition, 
had spooked him, and he got everyone out without being able to say exactly 
why he was doing so. 
So where, Kahneman wanted to know, did that quick feeling come from? 
His tracery got to a familiar answer, one both Winn and Nelson cite too: The 
chief ’s intuition came from his experience, not from some special, extrasensory 
gift. He had been in so many burning buildings before that he sensed something 
wrong before he could know or explain what it was.
I offer this example because, after a number of after-the-fact analyses, I 
now also think intuition is rooted in experience. And, if I accept that, then 
I must turn to my mountain experience as a way of knowing when to trust my 
intuition, when to follow a decision that can’t possibly be fully thought out 
in a rational sense. 
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Experience is another word for time spent, and time spent in the presence 
of a master is another way of describing an apprenticeship. That’s an old-
fashioned word, and it even contains an off-putting whiff of being trapped 
in a livelihood and life, but I want to appreciate its positive possibilities here. 
To do so, I’ll contrast it with a more modern word, training. We are always 
training or being trained, it seems. But training’s aim is often narrow and its 
duration short. It’s the sort of learning that prepares one for an assembly-line 
life—get real good at this one skill, then repeat, repeat, repeat.
An apprenticeship, however, lasts over time. Even when the apprentice 
strikes out on her or his own, becomes then master of self, the shaping work 
of the old master endures, is evident. Learning to be your own master takes a 
long time, a lifetime.
So it is, I think, in the mountains and with the various ways we step into 
and through them. If lucky, each of us becomes apprentice to a person, often 
an elder, and a landscape, a home mountain. At his or her feet, on our own 
feet, we learn; the lessons add up slowly. Often those lessons contain hard 
contact. We later treasure these bruises and scars—we won’t do it that way 
again, but we’re glad we did it once.
This slow uphill climb of time becomes finally our intuitive sixth sense 
in our mountains. But skipping those apprentice-steps, wanting to get “out 
there” in a hurry, sometimes leads runners and explorers to trust instead the 
judgments of others, and if ever those judgments are off, or a runner runs out 
of them, he or she can be left in the out there of trouble. Yitka Winn points 
out that trail runners can arrive at their mountains with a full résumé for 
endurance even as the trails and their ranges are all new. You can go a long way 
with such a résumé. So they can get a long way into terrain they know little 
of, or a long way into trouble without having the experience to recognize and 
manage it.
By now, you may be nodding off or paging ahead to see where this all 
ends. One more thread, and then I’ll tie off (and I will check my knot). The 
A small but growing number of people show up to hike, 
climb, or recreate in a place “discovered” online.
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development of solid analytical skills and experienced-based intuition must 
now contend also with the virtual world and its seductive promises—of course 
you can find whatever out; no need to memorize (which is a time-intensive 
knowing); simply click once or twice and it’s here . . . or there. 
As I write about mountain accidents and incidents, I’ve noticed a small but 
growing number that feature people showing up to hike or climb or recreate 
in a place “discovered” online. In the Summer/Fall 2018 issue, I wrote about 
a family that went online and found a swimming hole in a patch of New 
Hampshire wilderness. They set out for a July swim. The two adult sons ran 
ahead, and when they reached the pool, one simply jumped in. The water was 
high and roiled from recent rains, and for reasons unclear (it happened under 
water) that son foundered; his brother leapt in but was unable to bring the first 
man out of the water because of the steep-sided rocks, and the man drowned.
Leaping from a computer screen into a scene seen there can be both 
tempting and trouble. There is so much to know before you go.
I’ve just looked back at my working title for this piece—Running the Risk; 
it occurs to me that The Risk would be a good name for a trail, a lifelong one. 
Here’s to it, then—I’ll see you out on one corner or another of The Risk.
— Sandy Stott
Accidents Editor
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